Hermetism by Wouter J. Hanegraaff

 

Hermetism by Wouter J. Hanegraaff

Like most other early Christian authors with an African background (most notably Tertullian, Cyprian, Arnobius, and Lactantius), Aug. was familiar with traditions and writings attributed to the legendary Egyptian sage Hermes Trismegistus (Mahé 56–8). Apart from a few formulations in the Confessions (1.6.7; 4.15.24), which arguably have their origin in what is now known as Corpus Hermeticum 5 and 7 ( Van Oort ), Aug.’s main reference is undoubtedly the Latin translation of the no longer extant Logos Teleios , known as the Asclepius and available at least since the middle of the fourth century. Aug. first mentioned Hermes in two of his writings of around 400. According to Contra Faustum , the Manichaean Faustus had argued that since the Christian Church consisted mostly of converts from among the Gentiles, the Hebrew prophecies about Christ were of little use. Since they carry no authority for pagans, it would be more logical to refer to the Sibyls, Hermes Trismegistus, Orpheus, or any heathen poet, who are also said to have predicted the Son of God ( c. Faust. 13.1). 

Aug.’s initial response ( c. Faust. 13.2) was rather weak, but he came back to the issue a bit later, arguing that even if such pagan prophecies happen to contain some truths about God or the Son of God, this by no means makes their authors into religious authorities for Christians. The great difference is that these pagan sources teach idolatry and demon-worship, which is severely condemned by the Hebrew prophets. Even if the former occasionally say something that is true, it still remains that they compare to the latter as devils compare to angels (c. Faust. 13.5). Aug. ends the debate by sneering at Faustus, whose formulation suggests that he knows of these pagan prophets only by hearsay (ut fama est). The implication is that Aug. knows better because he has actually read them. That some truth may indeed be found even in the writings of the pagans, including Hermes, is further confirmed by Aug. in De baptismo 6.44.87, where he quotes a passage he found in Cyprian, according to which Hermes had called God incomprehensible and beyond human powers of estimation. 

Aug.’s main discussion of Hermes occurs in bk 8 of De civitate Dei where he discusses the ‘Platonic philosophers’ who share the Christian belief in an immutable divinity that concerns itself with human affairs, and yet argue that human beings must worship many gods created by the one God (civ.8.1). While Aug. discusses Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Porphyry in Hermes Trismegistus (only the first of whom could strictly be called a ‘Platonist’. The Egyptian Hermes Aug. believes to have lived long before Plato but aft er Moses; see civ.18.39). At the example of Apuleius’ De deo Socratis , Aug. refutes the central Platonic concept (Martin) of a matching ontological and moral hierarchy, which implies that all the gods are good, and in particular that the class of demons intermediary between men and gods must be morally superior to men because they are located at a higher level and have superior bodies (civ. 8.13–15). On the contrary, Aug. argues, demons are morally inferior to humans and therefore should not be worshipped, even though they may stand above human beings in the great chain of being. They have only evil intentions and have deceitfully persuaded men to worship them as gods. He then moves on to Hermes Trismegistus , whose opinion differs from Apuleius’ because he claims that the demons are actually gods and does not assign to them the role of interpreters and intercessors (civ.8.23–4).

In two relatively short passages of the Asclepius (23–4 and 37–8), Hermes had praised the Egyptian practice of ‘making gods’. Th e theory, as summarized by Aug., states that while the gods are spiritual beings created by the supreme God, humans for their part may create images (simulacra) that serve as material embodiment's for the gods. These simulacra are the Egyptian temple statues. By means of some ‘impious art’ of invocation, the invisible spirits are caused to inhabit these statues, which thus become living beings that can predict the future, cause illness, or bring about and generally bestow sorrows or blessings on men according to their merits. Aug. seems to have no doubt that the Egyptian cult statues are really animated by ‘gods’. Christians, however, know that all such gods are in fact evil demons and the practice praised by Hermes should be rejected as an obvious example of pagan idolatry. 

Asclepius 37 describes how the Egyptians first discovered the art of ‘god-making’, and in discussing that passage in his ch. 24, Aug. makes much of a formulation where Hermes seems to contradict himself: ‘because [quoniam] our ancestors erred gravely concerning the nature of the gods . . . they invented the art of making gods.’ Hence, although Hermes elsewhere praises the invention of god-making as a pious practice, here he seems to describe it as resulting from erroneous beliefs. Whether Aug. is right in his criticism depends entirely on the translation of quoniam, which probably reflects epeide in the lost Greek original (Scott 183.2; unfortunately Ascl. 37 is not included in the fragment of a Coptic translation of the Logos Teleios discovered at Nag Hammadi; see Mahé 152–207). 

Almost all modern translators (an exception is Salaman 94) have chosen to tacitly get rid of the contradiction by choosing the less usual option of translating quoniam as an indication of time, leading to translations such as ‘our ancestors erred gravely . . . but then they discovered’. Aug., however, uses the standard translation and argues that ‘in a wondrous manner’ ( miris modis ), Hermes himself was compelled to confess the error of idolatry even while recommending it. 

Having praised the animation of statues in Ascl . 24, Hermes goes on to predict a sorrowful time when this pious Egyptian practice will be totally forgotten. Th e land of Egypt, which is ‘an image of heaven’ and ‘the temple of the whole world’, will be occupied by foreign powers that will make religious worship into a capital offence. No longer venerated in their temples, the gods will return to heaven, leaving the holy land of Egypt in spiritual desolation, ‘filled completely with tombs and corpses’ (Ascl.24). In commenting upon this ‘hermetic apocalypse’, Aug. interprets it as a correct prophecy of the coming of Christianity, which is now indeed engaged in ‘overthrowing all these lying fictions’ (civ. 8.23). He ignores the fact that further on in the Asclepius , Hermes explains how God will finally restore the beauty of the world aft er this period of darkness and decline (Ascl.26). 

Aug. understands the ‘tombs and corpses’ in Ascl . 24 as referring to the memorials of Christian martyrs and devotes the rest of bk 8 to refuting the suggestion that Christians worship the dead. Interestingly, his formulation of the passage in question is much more precise than the one that can be found in the Latin Asclepius , but very close to the Coptic parallel. Both explicitly compare temples full of gods with tombs full of corpses (Van den Broek 103 ff.). Presumably, this means that Aug. was reacting against contemporary pagan opponents, who looked down on the Christians and their cult of the martyrs and may have been referring to the Logos Teleios to make their point (ibid. 103–5). Aug. turns the tables on them by arguing along euhemerist lines that it is the pagans who worship dead men as their gods. The Christians, on the other hand, honour their martyrs but do not worship them. 

Although bk 8 of civ. concentrates on refuting Hermes’ errors, Aug. concedes that his writings also contain much that is true ( civ.8.23). This is not surprising, given his similar statements in c. Faust.and bapt., and especially given his insistence on the idea that the ‘Platonic philosophers’ and those who think like them (civ. 8.10) are intellectually closer to the Christians than anyone else (civ. 8.5–9). As a result, it remained possible for later generations to follow Aug.’s authority in rejecting Hermes’ idolatry, while still accepting from the Hermetic writings whatever could be seen as compatible with Christianity. 

The general reception of Hermetism during the Middle Ages is a very large topic that cannot be treated in the present context (see Moreschini; Lucentini/Parri/Perrone Compagni; Lucentini/Perrone Compagni). It is clear, however, that Aug.’s bk 8 of civ. came to play an important role in it and eventually became a standard reference in theological discussions of pagan idolatry. Its impact on Hermes’ reputation as a whole was mitigated, however, by Aug.’s own admission that his writings contained some truth, as well as by a case of mistaken attribution. An anti-Arian tract known as Adversus quinque Haereses , now attributed to another North African *Quodvultdeus , contained a thoroughly positive discussion of Hermes based on Lactantius, without reference to pagan idolatry. Until the early twentieth century, it was believed to be written by Aug., and hence during the Middle Ages and Renaissance, it complemented and to some extent neutralized the polemics of civ. (Gilly 338–9). The medieval reception of Hermetism began in the twelfth century and was originally dominated by the Lactantian perspective of a concordance between Hermetism and Christianity. Hermann of Carinthia (De essentiis 1143) and *John of Salisbury (Policraticus 1159) discuss demons and the art of god-making while essentially ignoring Aug.’s condemnation of Hermes (Lucentini 1992 , 401–2). Towards the end of the twelfth century, *Alan of Lille even goes so far as to use the very reference to ‘god-making’ to defend Hermes against Aug., arguing that this greatest of all pagan philosophers taught the doctrine of the *Trinity . According to Alan, the Asclepius claims that ‘God has made eternal gods’ and these gods are none other than the Son and the Holy Spirit. Hence, ‘making gods’ really means ‘generating’ or ‘emanating’ the second and third person of the Trinity (Summa quoniam homines 1.2.31; cf. Porreca 2003, 145). It is with *William of Auvergne that Aug.’s position made a strong comeback and was firmly established as a negative alternative to the ‘Lactantian’ perspective. William’s opinion about Hermes is more complex than has oft en been assumed (Porreca 2000), for not only did he begin as an admirer of the Asclepius (Gilly 346), but he also oft en kept referring to Hermes as an authority even aft er Aug. had convinced him of the idolatry of the ‘godmaking’ passages. Those passages, however, were indeed sharply attacked by William, notably in De legibus (1228) and De universo (1231–6), as horrible cases of idolatry that must be exterminated ‘with sword and fire’ (gladio et igne). William’s attacks were part of a more comprehensive discussion of astrological, magical, and divinatory practices in general. His category of dei facticii , statues made in accordance with astrological constellations, animated by celestial spirits or planetary forces, and worshipped with fumigations, invocations, and chants ‘as if they were gods’ (De legibus23; see Lucentini/Perrone Compagni 505; Weill-Parot 187–8), was presented as an invention of Hermes. William based his views not only on Aug.’s condemnation, but also on a reading of the Asclepius itself (Porreca 2000), and he connected them with a series of familiar ‘technical hermetica’. Many of these were concerned with amulets and talismans, which could be seen as ‘small-scale reproductions of the statues animated by demons’ (Lucentini/Perrone Compagni 522).

In the wake of William’s polemics, theologians were forced to come to terms with the two conflicting images of Hermes, namely, as a pagan prophet of Christian truths and as a defender of wicked idolatry. This distinction was all the more urgent because Aug.’s condemnation was now seen as highly relevant to those many newly available ‘technical hermetica’ concerned with the potentially idolatrous ‘science of images’ (Weill-Parot). In the present context, one must nevertheless concentrate on explicit references to Aug. and the Asclepius Some authors, such as Thomas of York , treated the god-making passages as an isolated mistake (Lucentini/Perrone Compagni 506). Others, such as *Albert the Great , rejected the accusation of idolatry (ibid. 507, 524) and reaffi rmed Hermes as a pure monotheist (ch. 11 of the Speculum astronomiae , possibly authored by Albert, rejects Hermetic idolatry only with reference to the ‘technical’ hermetica). 

*Thomas Aquinas showed litt le interest in the Asclepius and merely repeated Aug.’s condemnation (Summa contra Gentiles 3.104). In the fourteenth century, Thomas *Bradwardine accused Hermes of imprudence and inconsistency but not of idolatry. Given his abundant emphasis on the One God, his references to ‘other gods or another god’ simply made no sense (Lucentini/Perrone Compagni 481, 508). Berthold of Moosburg likewise strongly emphasized the authority of Hermes as a monotheist and was therefore worried by the ‘god-making’ passages. On the one hand, he rejects them as an error, but elsewhere he speculates that a plurality of gods might be acceptable as long as they are understood as ‘gods’ only in the sense that they participate in the one true God (ibid. 482, 509). It has been argued (ibid. 482, 510) that a somewhat similar position was adopted by *Nicholas of Cusa in De docta ignorantia . But whereas Nicholas does not actually discuss the god-making passages there, he does adopt Aug.’s position in his De pace fi dei 720. 

Aug.’s condemnation of the ‘god-making’ passages became a major issue for Marsilio *Ficino , whose famous translation of the Corpus Hermeticum (1471) initiated the Renaissance revival of Hermetism. Ficino began the Preface to that translation by mentioning Aug.’s opinion about Hermes’ ancestry (civ. 18.39), along with the views of Lactantius and Cicero. Later on, he referred to the discussion in civ.8, but in a manner that was calculated to minimize Aug.’s criticism. Trismegistus prophesied not only the ruin of the ancient religion and the coming of Christianity, but also the birth of Christ and the future divine judgement. In fact, his prophecies were so impressive that ‘Aurelius Augustine could not decide whether [Hermes] pronounced many things from expert knowledge of the stars or through revelation by demons’ (Ficino 1471). But the central reference for Ficino’s reception of Aug.’s discussion of Hermes is his influential De vita coelitus comparanda (1489) in which he discusses the use of astrological amulets for medical purposes. Th e very title (‘On Obtaining Life from the Heavens’) would have reminded any well informed intellectual of the ‘god-making’ passages, but by means of his subtitle, Ficino tried to steer attention away from Hermes, towards the much safer authority of Plotinus: ‘in what, according to Plotinus, the power of attracting favour from the heavens consists, namely, that well-adapted physical forms can easily allure the worldsoul and the souls of the stars and the daemons’ (Ficino 1489,1). His reference was to Ennead 4.3.11, where Plotinus describes the animation of temple statues not as demonic invocation, but as a procedure for attracting the world soul by means of sympathetic attraction (ibid. 26.77–9). Obviously, this was a rather transparent way of referring to the Asclepius without actually mentioning it. The most dangerous references to astral magic occur in the final chapter of De vita coelitus comparanda , and here Ficino could not avoid referring to Hermes. In doing so, however, he cautiously avoided making any explicit references to Aug. and instead emphasized Plotinus’ ‘natural’ explanation (ibid. 26.77–93, 122–35). Claiming that Hermes held the same opinion as Plotinus, he writes that the statues were animated by ‘divine’ forces belonging to the anima mundi : ‘airy ones, not celestial, let alone any higher’. Ficino’s point is that the animation of material receptacles such as amulets does not need to involve demons in the sense of ‘supernatural’ entities, but can be explained as a powerful but harmless form of magia naturalis . It is a purely natural procedure. He does acknowledge with reference to Aquinas that in the case of speaking statues, demons are indeed involved, but adds that binding a demon to a statue by ‘astronomical’ procedures is simply not possible. 

Hence,although Ficino ’s De vita coelitus comparanda , and particularly its final chapter 26, is undoubtedly the central Renaissance text concerning the reception of Aug.’s view of Hermetism, it must be seen as a crypto-commentary (Hanegraaff 73, n. 193). Ficino’s att empts to disguise the reference to the Asclepius as a reference to Plotinus, while carefully avoiding any mention of Aug., reflect his acute awareness of the most vulnerable aspect of his entire worldview of an astrological magia naturalis . It always remained possible, on the basis of Aug.’s argumentation, to denounce the ‘benevolent’ powers of the stars as demons in disguise. In general, it is safe to say that authors after Ficino remained aware of the problem (for example, in his important 1505 edition of the hermetic texts, Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples simply printed lapsus hermetis next to the god-making passages), but tried to avoid being drawn into an explicit discussion. Roman Catholic Neo-Platonists could content themselves with invoking Ficino’s authority for presenting astral magic as natural, not demonic. Indeed, they would have had nothing to gain, but much to lose in stirring up the debate, and so they tended to avoid it. As for Protestant theologians, not only paganism but also the whole of Roman Catholicism was for them tainted with idolatrous image-worship anyway, so there was little point in singling out Hermes for special treatment. 

Wouter J. Hanegraaff